ABSTRACT Vehicular social networks (VSNs) are moving from infancy to maturity. However, the characteristics of wireless channel availability and the high mobility of vehicles in the VSNs create new challenges for privacy preservation; the corresponding solutions require a combination of technologies. A common theme in this paper is the combination of crowdsensing (CS) and the VSNs. We first design a threelayer CS-based VSN architecture that includes a CS layer, mobile management layer, and core control layer. Then, we propose a two-stage privacy-preserving (TSPP) algorithm to protect identity and location privacy for the CS-based VSN. In TSPP algorithm, to protect identity privacy, we design a way of identity management. Simultaneously, by correlation analysis, we design a suppression strategy to satisfy ε-privacy with no information loss for location privacy protection. The simulation results show that our proposed TSPP algorithm better protects identity and location privacy than current algorithms. The results are based on four metrics: average processing time, identity privacy, location privacy, and information loss.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the phenomenal growth of sensors and mobile devices [1] - [3] , mobile crowdsensing [4] - [5] has become an important technology for collecting and transmitting sensing data. A wide range of crowdsensing applications have been developed, including social media analytics platforms [6] , fine-grained air pollution monitors [7] , city environment monitors [8] and road traffic acquisition methods [9] . These crowdsensing applications have one commonality: the collected sensing data include location information. However, servers may be insecure and will reveal location information in crowdsensing applications. Moreover, because vehicular social networks (VSNs) must accommodate the characteristics of wireless channel availability and the high mobility of vehicles, crowdsensing-based VSNs [10] create new challenges for privacy preservation.
In recent years, crowdsensing applications have received attention due to the development of wireless communication technologies (e.g., 5G and Wi-Fi) and intelligent terminals [2] , [11] - [14] . Fig. 1 shows a crowdsensing (CS) system. In crowdsensing systems, handheld devices are used as fundamental sensing units that enable the collection of sensing data. This capability can facilitate the performance of largescale and complex social sense missions. Thus, there are outstanding advantages to applying CS systems to VSNs.
• Large Scale: Because crowdsensing applications are convenient, a large number of users are willing to participate in VSNs. And these users are characterized by extensive distribution and large scale.
• Fine-Grained Measurement: Each user has an intelligent terminal, such as a mobile phone, tablet, or smart camera, and some users own more than one intelligent terminal. Moreover, users come from a variety of classes and areas. Thus, the collected sensing data are fine grained. Prompted by the aforementioned advantages, significant attention has been given to crowdsensing-based VSNs. In crowdsensing-based VSN applications, sensing data are collected and transmitted using sensors on vehicles. This technique can address traffic issues in a low-cost, quick and easy way. In this paper, we consider a scenario where vehicles periodically upload sensing data (location, identity, et al.) to a crowdsensing platform. Then, crowdsensing platform servers analyze and manipulate these sensing data to reasonably arrange the cycle of traffic signals, detect traffic congestion, etc. However, users are paying an increasing amount of attention to privacy issues [15] - [19] . Enthusiasm for crowdsensing-based VSN participation will be severely affected if identities, locations or trajectory privacy [20] - [23] are breached. Accordingly, the amount of collected sensing data can be greatly reduced. Therefore, crowdsensing-based VSNs could become useless if privacy cannot be preserved. Thus, many scholars have studied privacy preservation issues [24] - [26] , and propose a wide variety of cloakingbased, dummy-based, obfuscation-based and cryptographybased location privacy preserving mechanisms (LPPMs). However, these existing LPPMs have not yet considered correlations of temporal, spatial and data between locations. Therefore, these existing LPPMs may real location privacy of users.
Through observation, it is straightforward to determine that servers receive substantial sensing information at an intersection. Vehicles often meet at intersections, which typically feature traffic lights used to control the confluence of multiple roads. The sensing data of users at intersections may be consistent, and the repetition rate of sensing information may be high. This paper utilizes this phenomenon to suppress the upload of some sensing data at a certain probability at certain locations, and proposes a two-stage privacy-preserving (TSPP) mechanism. TSPP approach can reduce the temporal, spatial and data correlations between two continuous locations of a vehicle. Thus, identity and location privacy can be protected.
However, a tradeoff exists between privacy preservation and information loss (IL). In this paper, we propose TSPP mechanism to protect privacy without IL. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We study three attack models: temporal correlation attack, spatial correlation attack and data correlation attack. Through correlation analysis of the attack models, we find the corresponding inhibition function and propose a suppression strategy. The suppression strategy utilizes intersection characteristics to suppress the upload of some sensing data without IL.
• We design a three-layer crowdsensing-based VSN architecture that includes a crowdsensing layer, mobile management layer and core control layer. To protect identity privacy, we dynamically divide vehicles into groups using k-anonymity technology in the crowdsensing layer.
• We propose a TSPP algorithm that includes group generation, identity management and location suppression. The TSPP algorithm can protect the privacy of vehicles and maintain ε-privacy without IL. The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work about privacypreserving schemes for crowdsensing systems and VSNs. Section 3 introduces attack models possible for crowdsensingbased VSNs. Section 4 describes preliminaries and objectives, and section 5 provides the details of the TSPP algorithm. The performance is evaluated in section 6, and section 7 concludes the article.
II. RELATED WORK
The concept of crowdsensing-based VSN [27] , [28] has attracted wide attention in the academic community. To encourage more vehicles to participate in crowdsensing systems, researches have studied many incentive mechanisms such as discrete crowdsensing incentive mechanisms [29] , truthful incentive mechanisms based on reverse auction [30] and offline and online incentive mechanisms with fair task scheduling [31] . Although these incentive mechanisms promote the development of crowdsensing applications to a degree, an increasing number of people realize the importance of their personal data and are unwilling to participate in crowdsensing applications. Therefore, researchers have also studied privacy preservation in crowdsensing systems. For example, the studies [24] , [32] - [36] have proposed different privacy-preserving mechanisms, such as anonymization, obfuscation and encryption. Table 1 compares these three privacy-preserving mechanisms. A trusted anonymous server is required for anonymization. the k-anonymity [37] technology is often used in anonymization. This approach can effectively solve privacy issues caused by untrusted servers and protect identity and location privacy. To realize k-anonymity, the work in [38] proposes a tessellation method to protect location privacy. First, the anonymous server generates a cell based on a user's VOLUME 6, 2018 real location, enabling the cell to cover at least other k − 1 users. Then, the server calculates an anonymous location that is the geometry center of the cell. Thus, the user sends sensing data with an anonymous location instead of his real location to maintain location privacy. Alternatively, Sánchez et al. [39] employs microaggregation to realize k-anonymity, wherein the anonymous server collects and repackages the k users' sensing data and sends these data to the core server, which can confuse the server so that it cannot recognize which data belong to which user. Thereby, microaggregation meets the requirement of privacy protection to a degree. Because of the existence of third-party anonymous servers, anonymization can be applied in a centralized manner; however, this scenario may cause a bottleneck and system delays when a large number of users participate in the crowdsensingbased VSNs. Moreover, this approach works against privacy preservation when the number of users is low. Conversely, obfuscation protects privacy by changing the attributes of users' sensing data. Thus, it communicates directly with the false data to not disclose the information of the true data. For example, the work in [40] adds random noise to users' real data using random data perturbation. As the obfuscation way can cause great IL and severely affect the quality of the system, it is not suitable for crowdsensing applications. Furthermore, encryption-based techniques are important for privacy preservation in current crowdsensing applications such as group signature and bilinear mapping. Combining Mix-Zone [42] with group signature [43] , the study presented in [41] produces a novel method, MixGroup, to protect privacy by increasing the number of opportunities to exchange pseudonym identities (PIDs). However, the encryption-based techniques require high performance requirements (e.g. the power of storage and computing) for the terminal equipment of users.
As the above methods of privacy preservation fail to consider the spatial/temporal correlation of users, a previous work [44] presents a crowdsensing scheme, PLP, that preserves privacy by filtering users' context steams based on correlation analysis. However, because VSN is a special ''internet of things'' network with unique features (namely, wireless channel availability and the high mobility of vehicles), PLP cannot be directly applied to crowdsensing-based VSNs. Therefore, to protect identity and location privacy for crowdsensing-based VSNs, this paper proposes a TSPP algorithm based on PLP.
III. ATTACK MODEL
To study privacy disclosure when correlation is not considered, this section describes three attack models: temporal correlation attack, spatial correlation attack and data correlation attack.
A. TEMPORAL CORRELATION ATTACK
Consider a 3rd-order hidden Markov model, as shown in Fig. 2 . Here, we suppose that the forward position of location B is location A and that location B is forward position of location C. Within a period, assume that a malicious attacker has obtained the target user's trajectory (A->B->C). Then, the attacker can guess that the vehicle's next location is E.
In Fig. 2 , there are three locations {E, B, D} related to location C. From location B, it is unlikely that the vehicle returns to location B; it is also unlikely to go to location D because the vehicle could have chosen a better route (A->D) than route A->B->C->D (the distance of route A->D is shorter and more consistent with people's habits). Therefore, the attacker can eliminate the unlikely positions {B, D} from set {E, B, D} with temporal correlation analysis. Thus, the attacker can speculate that the trajectory is A->B->C->E. If location E is a sensitive location for the user, the location privacy of the vehicle is breached. 
B. SPATIAL CORRELATION ATTACK
As shown in Fig. 3 , we assume that the vehicle starts from location A. The vehicle will reach location D if it passes location C. However, the next position may be location D or location E if it passes location B. Thus, the spatial correlation <C, D> is larger than the spatial correlation <B, D>. A malicious attacker may guess a user's location by spatial correlation analysis. For example, if the attacker knows that the vehicle moves from location A to location C, he/she can guess that the vehicle's next position is location D unless the vehicle turns back to location A, Then, the attacker can infer that the trajectory is A->C->D (as the black line shows in Fig. 3 ). If location D is a sensitive location for the vehicle, the location privacy is breached.
C. DATA CORRELATION ATTACK
Intersections are a confluence of several roadways. Moreover, vehicles wait for traffic lights at intersections. Thus, more sensing data can be collected at intersections. As shown in Fig. 4 , we can collect more sensing data at location C than locations {A, B}. Assume that the target vehicle starts from location A at time t 1 . Then, the attacker can guess the location by data correlation analysis. If the attacker discovers that the number of sensing data reported with the target vehicle increases at time t 2 , he/she can infer that the trajectory of target vehicle is A->C. Otherwise, the trajectory is A->B.
Through studying the attack models mentioned above, we find the temporal, spatial and data correlations between locations. Then this paper designs a corresponding suppression strategy to prevent these three attack models, and proposes an effective privacy preservation mechanism for crowdsensing-based VSNs.
IV. PRELIMINARIES AND OBJECTIVE
A. PRELIMINARIES 1) Sensitive location: According to a user's habits, locations that users care about are defined as sensitive locations. Assume that the trajectory of a vehicle is L = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n } over a period T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n }. Then, the set of sensitive position is expressed as S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s j , . . . , s m }, where s j ∈ L, m < n. Sensitive location s j is important and confidential to the vehicle user, who is not willing to disclose it to other users.
2) Privacy degree: Suppose that a vehicle collects the sensing data sequence D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n } for time T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n }. To protect privacy, sensing data may be suppressed from being uploaded to the crowdsensing-based VSN with a certain probability at certain locations. In this paper, Tr= {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n } represents the sensing data sent to the crowdsensing-based VSN for time T . If sensing data d i is suppressed at location l i , r i is empty (r i = e); otherwise, r i is the same as
Then, an attacker guesses the user's sensitive location with a prior probability f {l i = s j } and a posterior probability f {l i = s j |Tr} separately. If the difference between the prior probability and the posterior probability is in the range of ε, we say that the location of the vehicle satisfies ε-privacy, and we use ε to denote the location privacy degree.
3) K -anonymity: k-anonymity is a mechanism for privacy protection. In this scheme, users are divided into different groups. Each group contains at least k users to realize k-anonymity. Assume that there are u users in group G (u ≥ k). Then, the u users send their sensing data to servers. Thus, the sensing data cannot be linked to the corresponding user, and the attacker cannot distinguish each user's identity from the u users. The mechanism of k-anonymity protects identity and location privacy.
Exploiting k-anonymity, this paper realizes data aggregation to calculate the mean values of the data in group G. Suppose the original sensing dataset in group G is {d 1 
We define the data aggregation x(t) at time t with the flowing function:
where w i is the weight of sensing data d i (t). The w i measures the user's attention to the sensing data d i (t), and its size is set by the users according to the range of [0-1]. Thus, we can obtain mean values x(t) for data aggregation x(t):
To realize k-anonymity, we must ensure there are at least k vehicles in group G whose sensing data are suppressed. The sum of squares sos u for group G is defined as follows:
Then, the standard deviation SD u for u vehicles of group G is calculated as:
SD u describes the homogeneity of the u vehicles' sensing data in group G. When SD u is small, the amount information from the group is also small. Specifically, a lower SD u corresponds to higher information redundancy in group G. When all the original sensing data of group G are different from each other, we can calculate a critical value: SD-CV u . The relationship between SD-CV u and SD u is as follows:
Assume that there are w vehicles remaining that send sensing data after suppressing certain sensing data. Then, we can calculate the standard deviation SD w for the w vehicles.
Consider an extreme condition with u different types of sensing data in group G. The suppression of one sensing data VOLUME 6, 2018 point will cause IL from group G. Thus, IL is defined as follows:
Conditional random field (CRF): Before introducing CRFs, we present Markov random fields (MRFs), from which CRFs originate. An MRF is an undirected graph that includes nodes and edges. Each node in this undirected graph corresponds to a random variable; the edge between nodes indicates that there a probability dependence exists between the random variables corresponding to the nodes.
Given that there exists an observation for each random variable, we can determine the MRF distribution for a given observation set, which is the conditional probability distribution. This conditional probability distribution is a CRF.
In this paper, we consider a CRF with Tr = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n } observed states and L = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n } hidden states. The conditional probability isf (
where Z is the standardizing factor, is the potential function, and c is the set of cliques in the undirected graph. Temporal correlation analysis: Here, we consider two consecutive locations. Specifically, we use T n (L t−1 , L t ) to express the temporal correlation for location <A, B>, as shown in Fig. 2 .
Here, δ is an indicator function. Similarly, T n ( − → L ) is used to model the dependence of the n locations in the set of
Spatial correlation analysis: In this paper, we use h n ( − → L , − → T r ) to express spatial correlation. We also consider two consecutive locations, one of which is a sensitive location. For example, as shown in Fig. 3 , location D is a sensitive location, and spatial correlation <C, D> is defined as follows:
) is used to model the correlations between one sensitive location s j and the location l i associated with it. Thus, h n ( − → L , − → T r ) can be written as follows:
Where s j ∈ S and l i ∈ L − S.
Data correlation analysis: We use
to represent the correlation between two consecutive locations. As shown in Fig. 4 , more sensing data are gathered at an intersection. Thus, g n ( − → L , − → T r ) can be written as follows:
where dir(L t−1 , L t ) describes the driving direction of the vehicles and function vol(Tr t−1 , Tr t ) is used to calculate the sensing data volume. Thus, the CRF model for our privacy preservation can be written as follows:
This paper exploits the CRF model to implement a tradeoff between privacy preservation and IL.
B. OBJECTIVE
In this paper, we propose the TSPP mechanism to preserve identity and location privacy in crowdsensing-based VSNs. First, to protect identity privacy, vehicles are dynamically divided into groups by the k-anonymity approach at the crowdsensing layer (the bottom layer of the crowdsensingbased VSN). For a moving vehicle, we consider two consecutive locations. Assume that a vehicle is in location l a at time t i−1 and in location l b at time t i . Then, we generate two groups, G a and G b , for location l a and l b , respectively. When the two consecutive locations (l a , l b ) are in different groups, that is, (l a , l b ) / ∈ G a ∩ G b , the vehicle applies a new PID. Otherwise, the vehicle exchanges PIDs with other vehicles until the vehicle leaves the shared region G a ∩ G b .
Second, to protect location privacy, our aim is for the location of a vehicle to satisfy ε-privacy without IL. The objective function is
Thus, this paper aims to find a suppression strategy and then suppress certain sensing data from sequence D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n } to get Tr= {r 1 , r 2 , . . . ., r n }. This paper employs CRFs to model the temporal, spatial and data correlations. Based on correlation analysis, we propose a suppression strategy to prevent the three attack models mentioned in section 3. Thereby, location privacy is protected by eliminating temporal, spatial and data correlations between the consecutive locations.
V. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
This section introduces our system architecture's three layers: the crowdsensing layer, mobile management layer and core control layer.
VSN has certain special characteristics. First, the communication environment is extremely complex. Due to the vehicles' high mobility, the network topology changes quickly. Second, the communication between vehicles and other entities requires high reliability and low time delays. Fortunately, as the extensiveness geographical distribution of crowdsensing increases, the system can adapt to vehicle mobility and allow vehicles to easily access the VSN. Therefore, to achieve the VSN characteristics mentioned above, this paper builds a flexible VSN using crowdsensing technology and proposes the architecture of a crowdsensing-based VAN. This architecture can efficiently preserve privacy. The crowdsensing layer is composed of vehicles with on-board units, roadside units, base stations and other infrastructure. In this paper, we divide vehicles into groups using k-anonymity. The vehicles between groups and within groups can communicate with each other using a wireless sensor network based on the IEEE802.15.4 protocol, a Wi-Fi network based on the IEEE802.11 protocol or a cognitive radio network. The vehicle nodes collect sensing data about traffic environment, surrounding vehicle density, speed, and location, among other parameters. Then, the collected sensing data are sent to the upper layer (the mobile management layer). To protect location privacy, we analyze the locations of temporal correlation, spatial correlation and data correlation when a vehicle is moving. Then, certain sensing data can be suppressed from the mobile management layer.
The mobile management layer is composed of distributed switches and servers with certain computational storage capacities. As the storage and computing resources are limited for the vehicles, the application of computing and data analysis can be extended to the mobile management layer. This way can greatly save the resources of vehicles. Moreover, mobile management layer is close to the bottom of VSN architecture. It can be adapted to the high mobility of vehicles. Thus, the primary responsibility of mobile management layer is to store and forward data, quickly process some simple packets from vehicles, assist generate groups.
With the rapid development of VSNs, the amount of sensing data is constantly increasing. It not only requires a lot of bandwidth but also challenges the ability of data transmission and processing in the current VSN architecture. Moreover, the remote core network cannot meet the high mobility and real-time performance required of current VSNs due to the vast amounts of sensing data. Therefore, this paper proposes a crowdsensing-based VAN system architecture by adding the mobile management layer, which lies between in the crowdsensing and core control layers. This approach can greatly enhance the performance of local storage and computing power for the VSN and eliminate the bottleneck of data storage and transmission in the core network, thus improving real-time performance in our crowdsensing-based VSN.
The core control layer mainly consists of the cloud servers, which has powerful capabilities such as computing, scheduling and analyzing resources. This layer receives the sensing data from the mobile management layer and processes these data to obtain decision data, which it then sends to the vehicle nodes.
In our proposed crowdsensing-based VSN architecture, the servers may be unreliable in the mobile management and core control layers, which may lead to privacy disclosure. To protect location privacy, this paper suppresses certain sensing data in crowdsensing layer. However, the suppression of data transmission may cause IL because the control layer cannot collect complete information. Therefore, we propose a TSPP mechanism while implementing a tradeoff between IL and location privacy. Simultaneously, the TSPP mechanism strengthens privacy protection by considering identity privacy through the partitioning of groups using k-anonymity.
VI. ALGORITHM DESIGN
This section details the TSPP algorithm. We first introduce the overall design of the TSPP algorithm. Then, we detail the functions of the parts of the TSPP algorithm: Group_Generate(l i ), Identity_Manage(l i , l i+1 , G i G i+1 ) and Location_Suppress(l i , G i ). Table 2 shows the meaning of variables used in our proposed algorithms.
A. TSPP ALGORITHM
For privacy protection, we have proposed the TSPP algorithm for crowdsensing-based VSNs. TSPP provides dual protection for vehicle privacy, including identity and location protection. Thus, the TSPP algorithm obtains better privacy protection than current mechanisms. To address identity and location privacy protection, the TSPP algorithm considers two stages from two dimensions-the latitudinal dimension x and the longitudinal dimension y-as shown in Fig. 6 . Here, the latitudinal dimension is the direction of vehicle movement. From Fig. 6 , we consider the location privacy on the trajectory L = {l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 } of the target vehicle (the red vehicle in Fig. 6 ) from the latitudinal dimension. Certain sensing data are suppressed from the servers by analyzing temporal, spatial and data correlation between the consecutive locations on trajectory L. We first build a CRF model based on the correlation analysis. Then, we obtain the conditional probabilityf {L|Tr} to achieve ε-privacy for vehicle location. We consider the identity privacy from the longitudinal dimension. For each request of the vehicle at locations l i , TSPP generates an anonymous group G i with the help of the mobile management layer. The sum of squares (sos) of group G i must meet certain requirements to ensure it will not influence the IL of group G i . Furthermore, the generation of group G i is beneficial to the management of vehicle PID. Thus, we can protect vehicles' identity privacy by providing PID management.
In a way, location privacy preservation in the latitudinal dimension and identity privacy preservation in the longitudinal dimension complement each other. Thus, the TSPP algorithm can fully protect privacy and provide better privacy preservation than current methods.
Algorithm 1 is the pseudo-code for the TSPP algorithm. Obtain suppression probability p i = Location_Suppress (l i , G i ); // protect location privacy 10:
Algorithm 1 TSPP Algorithm
Suppress sensing data d i with probability p i ; 11: end for 12: Return Tr = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . ., r n };
From Algorithm 1, we know that the TSPP algorithm includes three main steps: group generation (Line 3), identity management (Line 6) and location suppression (Line 9). Consider a vehicle U with trajectory L = {l 1 , l 2 ,. . . ., l n } in the TSPP algorithm. First, TSPP obtains the sensing dataset D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n } from the input of trajectory L = {l 1 , l 2 ,. . . ., l n }. The output of the TSPP algorithm is the suppressed sensing dataset, Tr= {r 1 , r 2 , . . . ., r n }, where r i = empty if sensing data d i is suppressed with probability p i ; otherwise, r i = d i . Then, the TSPP algorithm generates group G i for each location l i by calling for the function Group_Generate(l i ). Next, the TSPP algorithm manages the vehicles' PIDs in the same group or between adjacent groups by calling the function Identity_Manage(l i ,  l i+1 , G i , G i+1 ). Finally, TSPP conducts correlation analysis between the consecutive locations to suppress certain sensing data d i with probability p i by calling the function Location_ Suppress(l i , G i ). Thus, the TSPP algorithm can effectively protect location privacy without IL and identity leakage.
B. GROUP GENERATION IN THE TSPP ALGORITHM
To ensure k-anonymity, the TSPP algorithm needs to generate a group with at leastk vehicles for vehicle U . However, it is insufficient to consider only that there are at least k vehicles in the group. We also should consider the homogeneity of all the sensing data of the vehicles in the group because a large homogeneity of a group corresponds to more of the same sensing data. Thus, we can filter redundant sensing data without IL in a group by exploiting the homogeneity of the group. Fig. 7 explains why group generation should consider both homogeneity and k-anonymity. Assume that there are four types of sensing data, indicated by a different colored rhombus in Fig. 7 ; we set kto 6. With k-anonymity, we generate two groups: G 1 and G 2 . There are 8 vehicles in both group G 1 and group G 2 . For group G 1 , there are only two types of sensing data, but group G 2 has four types of sensing data. Specifically, the homogeneity is larger in group G 1 than in group G 2 . For location privacy, certain sensing data may be suppressed (as shown by the dotted line in Fig. 7 ). For group G 2 , this condition causes IL of the brown and yellow sensing data, but there is no IL for group G 1 because two types of sensing data remain after suppressing certain sensing data. Therefore, by comparing the two situations in Fig. 7 , we find that IL is more likely when the group have a lower sum of squares, which can measure the homogeneity of the sensing data of a group. To protect location privacy without IL, this paper designs a method for group generation, as shown in Fig. 8 . Here, we describe how to generate a group for target vehicle U (the red vehicle in Fig. 8 ). First, we obtain sensing data d basing on location l of vehicle U . Then, we calculate the radius R by analyzing the information of d such as the location, speed and traffic density. Second, we initialize group G(l, R) . If the number of vehicles in group G(l, R) is lower than k, we extend group G using radius R = σ * 1 R until there are more than k vehicles in group G; σ 1 is the growth factor of radius R. Third, we calculate sos for group G. When sos is lower than 2 * soscv, there are fewer vehicles with the same sensing data. Thus, we amend group G to group G' shifting the center to distance r in the direction of the traffic density. Then, we calculate sos again. If sos is lower than 2 * sos-cv, we revise the distance r as r = σ * 2 r , where σ 2 is the growth factor of radius r . To ensure the target vehicle is in the group, r must be smaller than R. Thus, we can build a group for a target vehicle by employing the method shown in Fig. 8 .
Algorithm 2 is the pseudo-code for function Group_ Generate(l).
Algorithm 2 Group_Generate (l)
Input: location To protect identity privacy, this paper proposes the function Identity_Manage(l i , l i+1 , G i , G i+1 ) . To manage the identity of vehicles, we consider two consecutive locations < l i , l i+1 > for the target vehicle. There are two situations for < l i , l i+1 >, as shown in Fig. 9 . When the two consecutive locations are in the same group, the target vehicle exchanges PIDs with the encounter vehicles. When the two consecutive locations are in different groups, the vehicle applies a new PID from the servers.
This identity management method can effectively resist malicious attackers because the identity of the target vehicle is changed in different ways: identity is obtained randomly either through exchanging with other vehicles or from the servers. Thus, the target vehicle will be given different PIDs continuously along its trajectory, making it challenging for the attacker to guess the real identity of the target vehicle. Thus, identity privacy can be effectively protected using the TSPP algorithm.
Algorithm 3 is the pseudo-code for the function
Interchange PIDs with encounter vehicles; 3: else 4:
Apply a new PID; 5:end if
D. LOCATION SUPPRESSION IN THE TSPP ALGORITHM
For location privacy preservation, the TSPP algorithm suppresses sensing data with probability p i by calling the function Location_Suppress(l i , G i ). However, this approach may result in IL, which can affect the quality of service of the crowdsensing-based VSNs. Therefore, we must achieve ε-privacy without IL by solving the objective function:
Algorithm 4 is the pseudo-code for the Location_ Suppress(l i , G i ) function. The inputs to algorithm 4 are l i and G i . Our aim is to obtain the suppression probability p i for the sensing data at location l i . First, we calculate the standard deviation SD u for group G i . If SD u is equal to SD-CV u , then u vehicles have u different types of sensing data; thus, IL will occur if we suppress any sensing data at location l i . Therefore, the sensing data cannot be suppressed if p i = 0. However, we may be able to suppress sensing data by considering whether location l i is an intersection. If location
if (l i ∈ (intersection)) 6:
Initialize p i = 1; 7:
if (IL == 0)// no IL 8:
return p i ; 9: else 10:
Meet ε-privacy; 12:
return p i ; 13:
end for 14:
end if 15:
Initial p i = 0 17:
Compute posterior probability f {l i = s j |Tr}; end if 27: end if l i is an intersection, we initialize p i = 1. This technique gives priority to IL, and p i declines by 50 percent until both IL and ε-privacy requirements can be met. If location l i is not an intersection location, then we initialize p i = 0, which prioritizes privacy protection rather than IL; p i increases by 10 percent until both IL and ε-privacy requirements can be met.
E. ALGORITHM ANALYSIS 1) DEFENSE AGAINST CORRELATION ATTACK
We assume that the services lied in the mobile management layer and the core control layer are unbelievable. They may compromise the information of some vehicles with correlation analysis. We demonstrate that the proposed TSPP algorithm is capable of defending against such attacks. For the temporal correlation attack (as shown Fig. 2) , as location A is intersection, TSPP algorithm will suppress the sensing data in location A employing the temporal correlation T n ( − → L ). Then the attack only get the trajectory B->C instead of A->B->C. Thus, for the location C, the next position may be E or D. The trajectory may be B->C->E or B->C->D.
The attacker can efficiently protect against temporal correlation attack without revealing the sensitive location E. For the spatial correlation attack (as shown Fig. 3 ), TSPP algorithm calculates the spatial correlation of locations <C, D> and <B, D>. Then the sensing data in sensitive location D will be suppressed using the formula h n ( − → L , − → T r ). Thus, the TSPP algorithm can defense spatial correlation attack. For the data correlation attack (as shown Fig. 4) . TSPP algorithm will cut off the relation between directionality of vehicles and the sensing data volume with the formula g n ( − → L , − → T r ).
2) IDENTITY PRIVACY PROTECTION
TSPP algorithm generate a group G for a target vehicle using k-anonymity. The number of vehicles in group G is u (u >= k). Thus, the attacker guesses real identity with the probability of 1/u. Furthermore, the identity management method of the TSPP algorithm will make it harder. As the target vehicle will constantly exchange his/her PID with the encounter vehicles or apply a new PID. The probability of guessing vehicle's identity is far less than 1/u. Thus, identity privacy protection is realized.
3) LOCATION PRIVACY PROTECTION
In TSPP algorithm, the location is suppressed with a probability p i by calling the function of Location_ Suppress(l i , G i ). We also consider whether the location is an intersection. Because of the particularity of intersection, the probability p i is larger when the location is an intersection than the location is in general road. This way can guarantee the ε-privacy without IL after suppressing certain locations. Thus, the TSPP algorithm can effectively protect location privacy.
VII. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
This section evaluates the effectiveness of our proposed TSPP algorithm and compares the results with those of the MaskIt [45] and PLP algorithms. First, we describe the simulation environment. Then, we analyze the performance of TSPP using four metrics: average processing time, identity privacy, location privacy and IL.
A. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
We use OPNET to conduct our simulations on a PC with 3.7 GHz CPU and 8 GB memory. To simulate the CRF model, we construct an undirected graph, Gr(V , E), to represent a large real geographic area of approximately 3000 m × 3000 m in Xipu Town, Pidu District, Chengdu City, where V is the set of locations and E is the set of loads at Xipu. Then, we set the vehicle density to 0.3 v/m (that is, 900 vehicles in a 3000 m × 3000 m area) for undirected graph Gr. In our simulations, we investigate a target vehicle with a speed of 30 km/h. The simulation parameters are expressed in detail in Table 3 To simplify our simulation, this paper assumes that the target vehicle moves along a fixed trajectory L that includes 8 locations. The attribution of the 8 locations varies with the sensitive location density {0, 20%, 40%}.
B. SIMULATION RESULTS

1) AVERAGE PROCESSING TIME
We conduct five experiments, wherein a target vehicle sends requests along trajectory L. Thus, we find that the target vehicle sends 40 (5 * 8) requests. Then, we calculate the average processing time for one request. Here, the average processing time contains two parts: training the CRF model and making a suppression decision within a practical amount of time. Table 4 shows the average processing times for one request. As the PLP and MaskIt algorithms are employed on the basis that data correlation is invariable for an extended time, it is a lengthy process to train the CRF model. For one request, the PLP algorithm takes an average of 16 minutes to obtain the CRF model; MaskIt requires even longer. However, in this paper, the data correlation of crowdsensing-based VSN dynamically changes as the vehicle moves. The TSPP algorithm makes a suppression decision while building the CRF model. Thus, the TSPP algorithm reduces the average processing times by the merging training and workInPractice times; the algorithm does not spend time specifically in training. From Table 2 , we find that the TSPP algorithm makes a suppression decision for one request in 5 ms. The average processing time has been greatly improved using the TSPP algorithm. 
2) IDENTITY PRIVACY
As shown in Table 5 , our TSPP algorithm protects identity privacy, but the PLP and MaskIt algorithms do not. Thus, by comparing k-anonymity with TSPP, we validate the effectiveness of the identity privacy protection in terms of anonymity VOLUME 6, 2018 and the probability of identity leakage in our simulation, as shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 , respectively. When the target vehicle sends a request on trajectory L, we obtain a group G i for each location l i of trajectory L. From Fig. 10 , we find that the number of vehicles is constant (number(G i ) = 8) in each group using k-anonymity. However, the number of vehicles is at least 8 using the TSPP algorithm and the number of vehicles is 15 in group G 6 . Furthermore, a larger number of vehicles in a group corresponds to greater identity privacy preservation. FIGURE 11. Probability of identity leakage. Fig. 11 shows the relationships between the probability of identity leakage and TSPP and k-anonymity. For each group, the probability of identity leakage is 12.5% using k-anonymity, whereas our proposed TSPP algorithm can reduce the probability to 6.68%. Thus, the probability of identity leakage is significantly less for TSPP than for k-anonymity. Thus, the TSPP algorithm achieves superior performance for protecting identity privacy by considering two aspects: the degree of anonymity and the probability of identity leakage.
3) LOCATION PRIVACY
In this paper, to evaluate the ability of location privacy protection, we simulate three scenarios by setting the sensitive location density to 0, 0.2 and 0.4. Fig. 12 shows the simulation results when the sensitive location density is 0 (a sensitive location density of 0 means that there is no sensitive location). This shows that our proposed TSPP algorithm produces no location privacy disclosure in Fig. 12 . However, the PLP and MaskIt algorithms will have privacy disclosure: the PLP algorithm discloses 3% of the locations, and the MaskIt algorithm discloses 8% of the locations. 13 shows that approximately 20% of locations are sensitive locations. Although the TSPP algorithm uploads approximately 78% of the locations (8% of the locations are sensitive), the TSPP algorithm does not result in privacy disclosure. However, the PLP algorithm discloses approximately 2% of the non-sensitive locations. The MaskIt algorithm performs the worst, disclosing 3% of the non-sensitive locations and 5% of the sensitive locations. Fig. 14 shows the simulation result when the sensitive location density is 0.4. In Fig. 14, our proposed TSPP algorithm discloses few locations, and these disclosed locations are all non-sensitive. The PLP and MaskIt algorithms, however, disclose some sensitive locations. Fig. 12, Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 , we find that location privacy protection worsens with increased sensitive location density. Furthermore, our proposed TSPP algorithm works well with a sensitive location density of less than 0.4. Fig. 15 presents the relationship between the ε-privacy and IL. IL occurs when the location privacy degree ε is greater than 0.25 for the TSPP algorithm; the PLP algorithm causes IL when ε is greater than 0.1. However, no matter how small the privacy degree ε is, the MaskIt algorithm results in IL. Thus, the performance of our proposed TSPP algorithm is superior to that of the PLP and MaskIt algorithms.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the protection of identity and location privacy in crowdsensing-based VSNs. We first study three attack models (namely, the temporal correlation attack, the spatial correlation attack and the data correlation attack), which may occur in crowdsensing-based VSNs. After analyzing the privacy disclosure of the three attack models, we design a three-layer crowdsensing-based VSN architecture and propose a TSPP algorithm for privacy preservation. The three-layer crowdsensing-based VSN architecture contains a crowdsensing layer, mobile management layer and core control layer. The TSPP algorithm includes three stages: group generation, identity management and location suppression. Through the simulations, we show that our proposed TSPP algorithm effectively protects identity and location privacy through a tradeoff between IL and ε-privacy. Furthermore, our algorithm reduces the average processing time relative to existing solutions. 
